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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The English law on rescission of voluntary settlements and dispositions of trust 
property on the ground of mistake is governed by Pitt v Holt.1 The Jersey law is 
governed by the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, as amended by the Trusts (Amendment 
No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013. This article will review English and Jersey law in turn, 
considering their history and content and the ways in which they have been 
applied in recent cases. 
 
B. ENGLISH LAW 
 
(1) Prior to 2013 
For twenty years the most influential statement of equity’s jurisdiction to rescind 
voluntary settlements for mistake was Millett J’s formulation in Gibbon v Mitchell.2 
He said that voluntary transactions could be rescinded for spontaneous mistake, 
provided that the mistake concerned ‘the effect of the transaction itself and not 
merely … its consequences, or the advantages to be obtained from it’. Applying this 
rule, he set aside a deed under which a beneficiary had purported to surrender his 
protected life interest in the trust capital, believing that this would accelerate his 
children’s remainder interest into an immediate absolute interest. In fact, the 
effect of the purported surrender was to forfeit the beneficiary’s life interest and 
cause discretionary trusts to spring up in favour of the beneficiary and his children 
under the Trustee Act 1925, s 33. Because the beneficiary’s life interest was 
protected, he could not have achieved the desired effect by executing the deed: his 
proper course would have been to apply to the court for an order under the 
Variation of Trusts Act 1958. 
 Millett J said that if the beneficiary had been ‘asked the narrow question 
whether he intended to release his protected life interest … in favour of his 
children, he must have answered “Yes”.’ Nevertheless, his mistake had concerned 
the ‘effect’ of the surrender and not its ‘consequences’ because he had meant to 
surrender his protected life interest not ‘for its own sake’ but ‘with the effect that 
the beneficial interest in the capital of the fund should forthwith vest … in [the 
children].’ Judges in later cases noted that Millett J’s effects / consequences 
distinction was conceptually unstable, since it was unclear how one should decide 
whether any given outcome of a transaction fell within one category or the other. 
However, they welcomed the flexibility that Millett J’s approach gave them to keep 
the equitable jurisdiction within reasonable bounds and ensure that it was not 
exercised where parties had misconceived the commercial or taxation effects of 
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transactions or had knowingly run the risk that these might turn out badly.3 
 In Sieff v Fox,4 counsel then attacked the Gibbon test by arguing that it was 
inconsistent with Lindley LJ’s much earlier finding in Ogilvie v Littleboy, that in the 
absence of suspicious circumstances:5 
 
‘a donor can only obtain back property which he has given away by 
showing that he was under some mistake of so serious a character as to 
render it unjust on the part of the donee to retain the property given to 
him.’  
 
In Sieff Lloyd LJ (sitting at first instance) did not resolve the tension between this 
dictum and Millett J’s dictum in Gibbon, but in other cases it was suggested that in 
light of Ogilvie, the effects / consequences test should be abandoned in favour 
either of a ‘simple causative mistake’ test akin to the common law test for 
restitution of mistaken payments6 or a ‘serious causative mistake’ test.7 
 
(2) Pitt v Holt 
The correct test then fell to be determined in Pitt v Holt.8 Acting as the court-
appointed receiver for her incapacitated husband, Mrs Pitt executed a settlement 
of money paid to him pursuant to a personal injury claim. She sought to set the 
settlement aside when it turned out to have unforeseen IHT consequences. The 
first instance judge took Gibbon to be the governing authority, with the result that 
rescission was limited to cases where a mistake was made as to ‘effects’ rather 
than ‘consequences’. Mrs Pitt’s mistake did not qualify because the settlement had 
achieved what she had intended by way of legal effect and any mistake she had 
made had concerned the unforeseen tax consequences of the settlement; it was in 
any case doubtful that she had made a mistake, since she had not thought about 
the tax treatment of the settlement at all and had acted unreflectingly on advice.  
 On appeal, Lloyd LJ favoured a hybrid test that combined the Ogilvie and 
Gibbon tests.9 The claimant’s mistake had to be of one of two types. In the absence 
of some ‘additional vitiating factor’, such as misrepresentation or concealment, the 
claimant must either have made a mistake as to ‘the legal effect of the disposition’ 
rather than its ‘consequences’, or a mistake as to ‘an existing fact which is basic to 
the transaction’. It would not suffice that the transaction gave rise to unforeseen 
tax liabilities: this would be a ‘consequence’, rather than an ‘effect’, and so it would 
not bring the equitable jurisdiction into play. In addition, the mistake had to be of 
‘so serious a nature as to render it unjust on the part of the donee to retain the 
property given to him’. Lloyd LJ considered that this set a ‘very high test as to the 
gravity of the mistake’, an assessment that was borne out by his application of the 
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test to the facts of Pitt. In his view, Mrs Pitt had entered the transaction in the 
mistaken belief that it would have no adverse tax effects, and this mistake satisfied 
the Ogilvie test of seriousness, given that the IHT liabilities would significantly 
deplete the assets available to meet Mr Pitt’s needs during his lifetime. However, 
Mrs Pitt’s mistake concerned the tax treatment of the settlement and this was a 
‘consequence’ rather than an ‘effect’ of the settlement. Hence rescission on the 
ground of mistake was not available. 
 On further appeal, the Supreme Court found in Mrs Pitt’s favour on this 
issue.10 Lord Walker first considered what counts as a ‘mistake’ in this context. He 
held that a mistake as to present facts or law is needed and that a misprediction 
of future events is not enough. So one cannot rescind a voluntary settlement on 
the ground of mistake if one has executed the settlement in the expectation that 
something will happen in the future and it does not happen. 
 Lord Walker also distinguished ‘incorrect conscious beliefs’, ‘incorrect 
tacit assumptions’ and ‘mere causative ignorance’, and held that relief may be 
available for the first and second of these, but that ‘mere ignorance, even if 
causative, is insufficient’. These are terms of art which require some explanation. 
An ‘incorrect conscious belief’ is held by a claimant who knows at the time of 
entering a transaction that he would not enter it if a certain state of affairs existed, 
and who consciously bases his decision to enter the transaction on an incorrect 
belief that this state of affairs does not exist. An ‘incorrect tacit assumption’ is 
made by a claimant who knows at the time of entering a transaction that he would 
not enter it if a certain state of affairs existed, and who incorrectly assumes that it 
does not exist. A claimant is ‘causatively ignorant’ if he does not know at the time 
of entering a transaction that his decision-making would be affected if he knew 
that a certain state of affairs exists, but who would not enter the transaction if he 
knew this information, and in fact the relevant state of affairs does exist.  
 Suppose, for example, that a settlor settles property on his son who has 
secretly married without his consent. Suppose, further, that the settlor has always 
been determined not to support his children financially if they marry without his 
consent. In this case, the settlor makes a qualifying mistake when he executes the 
deed of settlement, whether he has a conscious belief that his son is unmarried or 
merely assumes this to be true. Compare a case where a settlor settles property 
on his daughter who has been a member of UKIP for the past 10 years. It has never 
occurred to the settlor that any of his children might join UKIP and he has never 
considered whether the knowledge that they had done so might affect his wish to 
benefit them. Now that he thinks about it, he can truthfully say that he would never 
have gifted property to his daughter if he had known she was a UKIP supporter. In 
this case, the settlor does not make a qualifying mistake, although knowledge of 
the relevant fact would have altered his decision to benefit her. 
 Having established what counts as a ‘mistake’ for the purposes of a claim 
for rescission, Lord Walker went on to discuss what types of mistake should entitle 
a claimant to the remedy. He rejected the Gibbon test, holding that it involved 
distinctions that were rigid, unclear, and difficult to apply. He also rejected the 
Court of Appeal’s hybrid test for the same reasons, and held that the true test is 
for a causative mistake of sufficient gravity to make it unconscionable to leave the 
mistake uncorrected. Lord Walker added that this test ‘will normally only be 
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satisfied when there is a mistake either as to the legal character or nature of a 
transaction, or as to some matter of fact or law which is basic to the transaction’; 
and that the question whether it would be unconscionable to leave a mistaken 
transaction uncorrected cannot be decided ‘by an elaborate set of rules’ but must 
be decided by an exercise of judicial discretion following review of all the 
circumstances ‘in the round’.   
 Applying his test to the facts of Pitt, Lord Walker concluded that rescission 
should be awarded because Mrs Pitt had made a sufficiently grave causative 
mistake respecting the tax treatment of the settlement to justify the court’s 
intervention, and it did not matter that this had been a mistake as to the 
‘consequences’ rather than the ‘effect’ of the settlement. 
 
(3) Since 2013 
The cases since 2013 have thrown up various issues that will now be discussed. 
 
(a) Causative ignorance 
Lord Walker’s finding that rescission may be available in cases of ‘incorrect 
conscious belief’ and ‘incorrect tacit assumption’, but not in cases of ‘causative 
ignorance’, is problematic for two reasons. The first is definitional: it can often be 
hard to say whether the facts of a case bring it within the second or the third 
category. The second is more fundamental, namely that Lord Walker gave no 
principled justification for awarding a remedy in the first two types of case but not 
the third. He spoke as though the normative question of when a remedy should be 
awarded turns on the semantic issue of what the word ‘mistake’ means. What 
matters, though, is not whether claimants can sensibly be described as ‘mistaken’ 
in everyday speech, but why a remedy should be awarded in some types of case, 
but not others, where a claimant would not have entered a transaction if he had 
known information that would have affected his decision-making. There is room 
for debate about the extent to which claimants should be allowed to reverse such 
transactions, given that no one’s decision-making can be informed by perfect 
information and everyone must accept some level of risk that their decision-
making will be compromised by ignorance. But Lord Walker did not enter into this 
debate and did not explain his decision to draw the line where he did. 
 Notwithstanding Lord Walker’s findings, the courts have found two 
(linked) ways to afford ‘causatively ignorant’ claimants a remedy. The first derives 
from Lord Walker’s own finding in Pitt that although rescission is not available in 
cases of ‘causative ignorance’, it may be available in cases where the claimant’s 
ignorance of some state of affairs ‘leads to an [incorrect conscious] belief or [tacit] 
assumption which the law will recognise as a mistake’.11 This dictum was followed 
in Van der Merwe v Goldman,12 where Morgan J held that the claimants’ ignorance 
of a change in the law affecting the tax treatment of their settlement ‘led them to 
a false belief or assumption that the creation of the settlement did not involve a 
chargeable transfer.’ In other words, causative ignorance does not qualify a 
claimant for relief but it does not disqualify him from obtaining a remedy either, 
and the facts of a case may support an argument that a ‘causatively ignorant’ 
claimant is also a mistaken claimant. 
                                                        
11 Pitt (SC) (n 8) [105]. 
12 [2016] EWHC 790 (Ch), [2016] 4 WLR 71 [41]. 
 5 
 Secondly, the courts have discovered ‘mistakes’ in cases where a settlor 
has never considered whether particular information might affect his decision-
making. This often happens because people often act in reliance on professional 
advice without understanding it or asking themselves what issues their advisors 
might have overlooked. Pitt itself was like this: Mrs Pitt had had no idea that the 
settlement might have IHT consequences and had simply followed the advice she 
was given. These were also the facts of Freedman v Freedman.13 
 The claimant’s father in Freedman had bought her a house to live in with 
her son, but she wanted to move and could not find a buyer for the house. Her 
father therefore lent her the money to buy a second house, on the understanding 
that this loan would be partly repaid from the sale of the first house when that was 
achieved. Acting in accordance with her father’s wishes, and on the advice of her 
father’s solicitor, the claimant executed a settlement of both houses. The point 
was, first, to shield the properties from her former boyfriend (the father of her 
child) and any other man with whom she might form a relationship, and, secondly, 
to ensure that her siblings were treated fairly: the terms of the trust provided that 
the claimant should have a life tenancy, with a remainder interest to her son, 
subject to a discretionary power of appointment in favour of the claimant, her son, 
her siblings and their issue. The claimant’s father died, the first house was sold, 
and only at this juncture was it realized that the transfer of assets into the trust 
had produced tax consequences overlooked by the solicitor: the creation of the 
trust had given rise to an immediate IHT entry charge and ongoing 10-yearly and 
exit charges. The claimant therefore applied to set the settlement aside on the 
ground of mistake. Her application was opposed by HMRC, which wished to collect 
the £156,000 tax liability that had arisen, but Proudman J ordered rescission.   
HMRC argued that the claimant had not made a qualifying mistake of the 
kind described in Pitt because she had merely been ignorant of the fact that 
creating the settlement would produce disadvantageous tax consequences. The 
claimant replied that she had made a qualifying mistake because she had acted on 
the basis of an incorrect tacit assumption that her father and the solicitor would 
not have advised her to enter an arrangement which would trigger a tax liability 
that would compromise her ability to repay her father’s loan. Proudman J found 
for the claimant on this issue. 
Pitt and Freedman both suggest that where a claimant’s professional 
advisor makes an error of omission, the claimant may obtain a remedy by saying 
that he made an incorrect tacit assumption that the advisor would consider and 
advise on all relevant aspects of the relevant transaction, whether or not he was 
told to do so, and whether or not the claimant was aware that knowledge of some 
aspect of the transaction would affect his decision whether to enter it. Whether 
this is too favourable to claimants depends in part on the justificatory reasons for 
allowing rescission on the ground of mistake, which were not clearly articulated 
in Pitt. However, it does appear to be out of line with the basis on which the rule 
in Re Hastings-Bass14 was reformulated in the same case.  
In Pitt Lord Walker affirmed Lloyd’s LJ’s finding that a trustee or other 
power-holder cannot invoke the rule in Re Hastings-Bass to rescind a disposition 
of trust property if he has acted on advice given by a professional who was 
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selected with reasonable care, as he would then have discharged his duty to 
consider all and only relevant matters when deciding whether to exercise the 
relevant power, and the rule applies only where decisions are made in breach of 
this duty. The policy reason for this change to the law was that HMRC should not 
be deprived of tax revenue where the losses caused by mistaken exercises of 
power by trustees and other power-holders can be recouped from their negligent 
professional advisers (and their insurers). However, the law governing the 
rescission of voluntary dispositions for mistake now produces exactly this result, 
since it enables a trustee or power-holder who disposes of trust property in a way 
that triggers unforeseen tax liabilities to say that he incorrectly assumed that his 
lawyer or accountant would have warned him about these. These points appear 
to have been made by HMRC in Freedman, but did not persuade the judge.15 
 
(b) Sufficiently serious mistake 
In the Court of Appeal in Pitt, Lloyd LJ laid down a strict test for mistake for the 
same reason that he reformulated the rule in Re Hastings-Bass: to deprive badly 
advised trustees (and their advisers) of a ‘get out of jail free card’. In the Supreme 
Court Lord Walker agreed that they should not be able to reverse the 
consequences of their ‘tax mistakes’ too easily, but his abrogation of the Gibbon 
rule meant that he needed to place some other limit on trustees’ ability to claim 
rescission for mistake. Lord Walker seems to have thought that his ‘sufficiently 
serious mistake’ rule could do the job, but the courts have not interpreted this rule 
in a restrictive way, and Lord Walker himself did not give them a very strong steer 
in this direction, given that he allowed Mrs Pitt’s claim. 
The cases since 2013 suggest that it is not hard for claimants to satisfy Lord 
Walker’s test. In Freedman, Proudman J held that if the unanticipated consequence 
of the settlement had only been that IHT was payable, she might have held that 
the mistake was insufficiently serious. However, the fact that the tax charge made 
it impossible to repay the loan made a difference, since it meant that ‘the 
settlement was so affected by the tax consequences that its effect was entirely 
different from that which [the claimant] believed it to be.’16 In Wright v National 
Westminster Bank Plc,17 Norris J held that a husband and wife made a sufficiently 
‘grave’ mistake when they transferred property into a discretionary trust in the 
mistaken belief that the wife could continue to draw income from the trust 
property during her husband’s lifetime. In Van der Merwe v Goldman the key factor 
leading to Morgan J’s conclusion that a sufficiently serious mistake had been made 
was the size of the tax bill resulting from the claimants’ arrangements: this 
amounted to about £450,000.18 Likewise in Kennedy v Kennedy19 the size of the 
claimants’ tax bill was the clinching factor for Etherton C – in that case, it was 
around £650,000. 
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(c) Tax avoidance schemes 
In Pitt, Lord Walker sought to place a further limit on the availability of rescission 
in tax mistake cases when he said that in:20 
 
‘some cases of artificial tax avoidance the court might think it right to 
refuse relief … on the ground that discretionary relief should be refused on 
grounds of public policy’.  
 
This dictum does not reflect previous judicial thinking in applications under the 
Variation of Trusts Act 1958, in which context the courts have frequently ordered 
variations the sole purpose of which has been to save tax.21 It seems, however, that 
Lord Walker wished to depart from these authorities, having suggested that the 
time had come to do so in the course of argument to Robert Ham QC, and having 
received a positive answer to this suggestion from counsel, provided that a line 
was drawn between cases of tax mitigation and cases of tax avoidance. Ham now 
regrets having made that concession, as Lord Walker’s new rule was inconsistent 
with settled authority and should therefore have been introduced by Parliament 
rather than the court, not least because Parliament had just legislated to introduce 
a general anti-abuse rule.22 
 In Kennedy,23 Etherton C declined to withhold rescission on this ground 
because the appointment of trust property which the claimants sought to set aside 
had not amounted to an ‘artificial tax avoidance arrangement’ and had comprised 
a legitimate attempt to reorganise the trust in a tax efficient manner, in a way that 
had been expressly contemplated by the Finance Act 2006. In Van der Merwe,24 
Morgan J went further, and held that it would be inappropriate for him to deny 
rescission on this ground in light of the Supreme Court’s findings in relation to the 
ex turpi causa principle in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc.25 He did not 
elaborate on the reasons for this, but if they turned on the fact that Lord Sumption, 
speaking for the Apotex majority, denied that the courts have a discretion to 
withhold private law remedies where the claim is tainted by illegality, then they 
have been overtaken by Patel v Mirza,26 where Lord Toulson, speaking for the 
majority, held that the courts do have such a discretion. 
However, Lord Toulson also stipulated in Patel that when exercising this 
discretion the courts should consider the policy of the rule making the relevant 
transaction illegal, and whether denying a remedy would be disproportionate. In 
Pitt, Lord Walker referred to WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC,27 but as Simon Taube QC has 
written, the Ramsay doctrine is ‘not a doctrine that allows the court to refuse 
equitable relief where it would otherwise be available’: it is merely a rule of 
statutory construction.28 Where a claimant has entered a botched tax avoidance 
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scheme, the court would therefore have to look at the Finance Act 2013, Part V, 
which contains the General Anti-Abuse Rule.  
The first question would be whether the relevant arrangements were 
‘abusive’ in the sense used in s 207 of the 2013 Act. If they were not, then refusing 
to order rescission would clearly go beyond the legislation. But even if they were, 
the further question would then arise, whether denying rescission would be a 
disproportionate response. Under s 210, the courts cannot penalise taxpayers for 
making abusive tax arrangements: they can only make ‘just and reasonable’ 
adjustments to counteract the tax advantages procured by the taxpayer’s abusive 
arrangements. However, claimants never seek to rescind arrangements which 
have produced tax advantages: they only ever seek rescission of arrangements 
which have gone wrong and produced larger tax liabilities than the claimants 
would have incurred if they had not done anything at all. Withholding rescission 
in such cases would effectively penalise claimants, and so it would arguably be 
disproportionate because it would be inconsistent with Parliamant’s decision not 
to penalise entry into abusive arrangements.  
 
(d) Partial rescission 
English law does not permit the partial rescission of contracts. If a claimant can 
set aside a contract, e.g. for misrepresentation or undue influence, then it must be 
set aside entirely even if the claimant would have agreed to different terms 
irrespective of the misrepresentation or undue influence.29 It seems, however, 
that the courts may order partial rescission of voluntary dispositions on the 
ground of mistake. This follows from Etherton C’s decision in Kennedy v Kennedy.30 
Kennedy created a settlement of property including cash and company 
shares. The trustees were Kennedy, his wife, and their solicitor. Kennedy had a life 
interest in possession and there was a power of appointment exercisable in favour 
of Kennedy, his children and remoter issue. In default of any appointment, the 
capital was held on trust for the children. The tax treatment of interest in 
possession trusts was then altered by the Finance Act 2006, but the legislation 
allowed a transitional period during which trusts could be reorganised to mitigate 
the effects of this: trustees could create a ‘transitional serial interest’, which 
effectively permitted an interest in possession to be terminated in favour of 
another interest in possession and for that to be a potentially exempt transfer. 
Kennedy and his wife were advised to take advantage of this opportunity, and to 
reduce future IHT liability by appointing certain assets to Kennedy and the 
children. However, the shares had to be kept inside the settlement, as they did not 
qualify for holdover relief for capital gains tax purposes. The trustees signed a 
deed of appointment, in which two clauses provided for the appointment of assets 
to the children, and a third provided that other assets should be appointed 
irrevocably on trust for Kennedy absolutely. Those assets were listed in a 
schedule, which included the shares. The effect was to generate a CGT liability of 
around £650,000. The trustees sought rectification of the clause appointing 
property to Kennedy by the addition of words to exclude the shares, or 
alternatively rescission of the clause. 
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Etherton C declined to order rectification because although Kennedy and 
his wife had intended that the clause appointing property to Kennedy should only 
effect an appointment of cash, the solicitor-trustee had intended that the shares 
should also be included in the appointment because he mistakenly thought that 
there were stockpiled losses inside the settlement against which the capital gains 
could be offset and that Kennedy had intended to use these when making an 
appointment of the shares to himself. However, the clause could be severed from 
the rest of the appointment and set aside. Etherton C commenting that:31  
 
‘There is authority that there cannot be partial rescission of a contract; it 
must be set aside as a whole and not only as to part ... That limitation makes 
sense in a contractual context and as preventing the court in effect 
imposing a different contract to the one the parties actually made. I see no 
reason, however, why that limitation should apply to a self-contained and 
severable part of a non-contractual voluntary transaction.’ 
 
(e) Proprietary relief 
It is often said that the intervention of third party rights constitutes a bar to 
rescission in equity. However, the courts have generally managed to protect third 
party purchasers from a defendant without barring rescission, e.g. by letting them 
keep the relevant asset but making the defendant hand over the proceeds of sale 
or exchange products.32 This type of order is possible because the courts have held 
that equitable rescission of a contract under which legal title to property was 
transferred to a defendant leads to the retrospective imposition of a trust on the 
property, so that the claimant can trace into substitute assets held by the 
defendant and assert an equitable proprietary claim to those instead.33 It seems 
that similar rules apply where voluntary transactions are rescinded for mistake, 
following Bainbridge v Bainbridge.34  
The claimants were a father and son, who farmed in partnership. They 
were concerned about possible claims against their land from other children of 
the father on his death, and a possible claim from the son’s wife on divorce. The 
claimants said (though the solicitors denied it) that they were advised by their 
solicitors to transfer several pieces of land into a discretionary trust and were 
incorrectly advised that this would not trigger a charge to CGT. Two pieces of land 
were later sold by the trustees, and the sale proceeds were used to buy new land. 
It was then discovered that the transfer of the land into the trust had triggered 
CGT liabilities in excess of £200,000. The claimants applied to have the trust set 
aside. However, they accepted that the purchasers of the trust land had been in 
good faith and did not seek an order impugning the sales. Instead they sought an 
order that legal title to the new land should be transferred to them. 
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34 [2016] EWHC 898 (Ch), [2016] WTLR 943. 
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Master Matthews granted the order sought. He accepted that an important 
bar to rescission is that third parties must not be deprived of rights which they 
have acquired in good faith. However, he said:35  
 
‘that is a bar to rescission resulting in the rights now belonging to the third 
parties being restored to the claimant. It is not a bar on other rights being 
so restored, if that is possible.’  
 
The claimants were entitled to the new land by analogy with Rimer J’s findings in 
Shalson v Russo, that:36 
 
‘upon rescission of a contract for fraudulent misrepresentation, the 
beneficial title which passed to the representor under the contract revests 
in the representee. The representee then enjoys a sufficient proprietary 
title to enable him to trace, follow and recover what, by virtue of such 
revesting, can be regarded as having always been in equity his own 
property.’  
 
The present case concerned unilateral mistake, but:37 
 
‘[the] consequence of the rescission is the same whether it takes place 
because of fraudulent (or negligent) misrepresentation, or because of 
causative and basic unilateral mistake.’ 
 
(f) Bilateral transactions 
Lord Walker’s comments in Pitt only concerned the equitable jurisdiction to 
rescind voluntary dispositions for mistake, and they do not apply to dispositions 
made under pension schemes and other contractual arrangements. Such cases are 
covered by the rule that a bilateral transaction can only be set aside for mistake if 
the error makes the thing transacted for essentially different from the thing that 
it was believed to be.38 So held Park J in Smithson v Hamilton.39 This suggests that 
on suitable facts, HMRC and other parties wishing to oppose rescission might get 
some mileage out of arguing that the case concerns a transaction entered pursuant 
to a contractual obligation. In the absence of facts supporting the existence of a 
contract, however, this argument will not succeed. 
 This is demonstrated by Van der Merwe v Goldman.40 A husband and wife 
were the joint freehold owners of a house which they occupied as their family 
home. On 24 March 2006 they executed a transfer of the title to the house to the 
husband alone, for no stated consideration. On 27 March the husband transferred 
title to himself and his wife as the trustees of a settlement for the benefit of the 
husband, the wife, their children and remoter issue. The purpose of these 
                                                        
35 Bainbridge (n 34) [20] (his emphasis). 
36 [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281 [122]. 
37 Bainbridge (n 34) [30]. 
38 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, [2003] 
QB 679. 
39 [2007] EWHC 2900 (Ch), [2008] 1 WLR 1453 [123], declining to follow dicta to the contrary in 
AMP (UK) plc v Barker [2001] Pen LR 77 [80]-[82] (Lawrence Collins J) and Gallaher Ltd v Gallaher 
Pensions Ltd [2005] EWHC 42 (Ch), [2005] Pen LR 103 [150] (Etherton J). 
40 Van der Merwe (n 12). 
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arrangements were to obtain certain tax advantages: they calculated that no IHT 
would be payable and, because the settlor would not become domiciled in the UK 
until 6 April, money could be borrowed against the security of the house, to be 
invested outside the UK as excluded property falling outside the IHT net. These 
plans went awry owing to changes to the tax treatment of interest in possession 
settlements announced in the 2006 Budget as taking effect from 23 March 2006. 
In 2012, the parties discovered that as a result of these changes, they had become 
liable to pay substantial IHT charges. They applied for an order that the transfer 
of legal title and settlement should be set aside on the ground of mistake, and 
Morgan J made the order sought. 
HMRC argued that the husband and wife had made a contract under which 
the wife agreed to transfer her half share in the house to her husband in exchange 
for him executing the settlement under which she was a beneficiary. They replied 
that the transfer of legal title was an outright gift leaving the husband free to deal 
with the house as he pleased, there being no intention to create legal contractual 
relations. Morgan J found for the husband and wife on this issue. The wife had 
transferred legal title to the house as part of a single arrangement, the point of 
which was for the parties to settle the house on trust for themselves and their 
issue. It followed that the case was governed by the rules governing rescission of 
voluntary settlements laid down in Pitt rather than the stricter rules governing 
the rescission of contractual arrangements laid down in Great Peace Shipping. 
 
(4) Conclusion 
Although the rule in Re Hastings-Bass was significantly cut down by the Supreme 
Court in Pitt, and although that change in the law was motivated by considerations 
which one might have thought would also affect the rescission of voluntary 
dispositions for mistake, it is now comparatively easy for trustees and power-
holders to invoke mistake as a means of escaping from the unintended tax 
consequences of their decisions to dispose of trust property; settlors can easily 
rescind their settlements on the same ground. HMRC do not view these 
developments with equanimity, and have argued against rescission in several of 
the foregoing cases, but so far their arguments have fallen on deaf ears. 
 
C. JERSEY LAW 
 
(1) Prior to 2013 
The Jersey legislature and courts have been similarly (if not more) generous to 
settlors and trustees, and they have been forthright in stating why. In Re R, 
Commissioner Bailhache declined to adopt the hybrid test laid down for English 
law by the Court of Appeal in Pitt, and explained:41  
 
‘[We are troubled by the weight given by this test] to the interests of the 
tax authority. We entirely accept that it is open to the courts of any country 
to lay down their own judicial policy in relation to the exercise of an 
equitable jurisdiction. The preference accorded to the interests of the tax 
authority in the UK is not one, however, with which we are sympathetic. In 
our view, Leviathan can look after itself. … [In] Jersey it is still open to 
                                                        
41 [2011] JRC 117 [39]. 
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citizens so to arrange their affairs, so long as the arrangement is 
transparent and within the law, as to involve the lowest possible payment 
to the tax authority. … We accordingly see no reason for adopting a judicial 
policy in this country which favours the position of the tax authority to the 
prejudice of the individual citizen, and excludes from the ambit of 
discretionary equitable relief mistakes giving rise to unforeseen fiscal 
liabilities.’ 
 
In Re R the court therefore reaffirmed the finding by Commissioner Clyde-Smith 
in Re the A Trust42 that the effects / consequences distinction forms no part of 
Jersey law, and that under Jersey law voluntary dispositions can be set aside in 
cases of serious causative mistake, i.e. where they would not have been entered 
but for a mistake that was of ‘so serious a character as to render it unjust on the 
part of the donee to retain the property.’43 As previously discussed, the Supreme 
Court rejected the hybrid test espoused by the Court of Appeal in Pitt and affirmed 
the Ogilvie test; and as subsequently noted in Re the Strathmullen Trust, the effect 
of this decision was ‘broadly to align’ English and Jersey law.44 
 
(2) The Trusts (Amendment No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013 
In the same year, the Trusts (Amendment No 6) (Jersey) Law 2013 was passed. 
This preserved the rule in Re Hastings-Bass in the form which it had taken in 
English law prior to its curtailment in Pitt. More pertinently for present purposes, 
it also gave statutory force to the principles laid down in the Jersey cases on the 
rescission of voluntary dispositions for mistake. These principles can now be 
found in the amended version of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984, as follows. 
 Article 47E provides that the court may set aside a transfer of property 
into a trust where the settlor made a causative mistake ‘of so serious a character 
as to render it just for the court to make a declaration’. Article 47G provides that 
the court may set aside an exercise of power in relation to a trust or trust property 
where the trustee or other power-holder made a mistake of the same character. 
Article 47B defines ‘mistake’ to include mistakes as to the effects, consequences, 
and advantages of a transfer, mistakes of past and present fact, and mistakes of 
law (including the law of a foreign jurisdiction). Article 47C provides that the 
Jersey customary law doctrine of erreur does not apply in this context, resolving a 
question previously raised in Re the B Life Interest Settlement,45 where it was 
suggested that because a gift can form a contract under Jersey customary law, the 
contractual rules of erreur might govern the rescission of gifts into a settlement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
42 [2009] JRC 447, [2009] JLR 447. 
43 Further decisions to this effect included Re the Lochmore Trust [2010] JRC 068; Re S Trust [2011] 
JRC 117, [2011] JLR 275; and Seggins v Apex Trust Co Ltd [2013] JRC 077. 
44 [2014] JRC 056 [20]. See also Re the Great Escape Trust and the Wentworth Trust [2015] JRC 259 
[28]. 
45 [2012] JRC 229, [2013] JLR 1. 
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(3) Since 2013 
The cases since 2013 have thrown up various issues that will now be discussed. 
 
(a) Scheme of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 
The 2013 amending law left it unclear how the new Articles related to the existing 
provision in Article 11(2)(b)(i), that a trust shall be invalid to the extent that the 
court declares that the trust was established by mistake. In Re the Strathmullen 
Trust,46 the court held that the new Articles are intended to be additional 
provisions to those in Article 11 and are not intended merely to be aids to 
construction of the Article 11 provisions. This is so despite the fact that:  
 
‘if all transfers of property into a trust are set aside under Article 47E as a 
result of a relevant mistake made, there may as a consequence be no 
property in the trust at all [with the] result … that while there once was 
apparently a trust with property in it, there is no longer trust property, and 
pursuant to Article 2, the trust itself ceases to exist.’  
 
The same point was made, but the same conclusion drawn, in Re the Robinson 
Annuity Investment Trust;47 and revisiting this issue in Re the Great Escape Trust 
and the Wentworth Trust,48 the court held that where it is sought to rescind 
transfers which immediately constituted a trust, Article 11 applies, but that Article 
47E applies where transfers are made into an existing trust. 
 
(b) Sufficiently serious mistake 
Like the English courts, the Jersey courts are quick to find that a sufficiently 
serious mistake has been made to justify rescission in cases where unanticipated 
tax liabilities of any magnitude have arisen.49 Unlike the English courts, the Jersey 
courts have also said that it would be positively undesirable to require settlors 
and trustees to sue their professional advisers for negligence as an alternative to 
setting their dispositions aside.  
For example, in Re the Strathmullen Trust the court thought that it would 
be ‘seriously unjust’ to require the settlor to do this when the outcome of any 
litigation against his advisers was uncertain.50  Still more strikingly, in Re the Great 
Escape Trust, the court rescinded a settlement even though no adverse financial 
consequences would have ensued for the settlors if rescission had not been 
granted, as they had already sued the promoters of the botched tax avoidance 
scheme they had sought to implement and as part of a settlement agreement with 
them had won an indemnity against any tax liability which they might be found to 
owe if the trust were not rescinded. Nevertheless the court held that their mistake 
was sufficiently serious to justify the court’s intervention. There was: 51  
 
‘something unattractive about the proposition that the Court should come 
to the rescue of foreign tax payers who, anxious to avoid paying the 
                                                        
46 [2014] JRC 056 [12]-[18]. 
47 [2014] JRC 133 [26]-[31]. 
48 [2015] JRC 259 [21]-[22]. 
49 e.g. Re Z Trust Ltd [2016] JRC 048 [35]. 
50 Strathmullen (n 46) [27]. 
51 Great Escape (n 48) [36]. 
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contribution towards the outgoings of their own jurisdiction’s government, 
and thus meet their own obligations as citizens of that jurisdiction, make 
schemes of this nature.’ 
  
Nevertheless, relief should be granted because the settlors had already suffered 
the stress of risky litigation against their professional advisors for 4 years, and it 
was probable that denial of relief would lead to more stressful litigation on appeal. 
 
(c) Tax avoidance schemes 
The latter case brings to mind Lord Walker’s dictum in Pitt that the courts might 
choose not to exercise their equitable discretion to set dispositions aside where 
these have been made as part of a botched tax avoidance scheme – although as 
previously discussed, it is doubtful whether it would be appropriate for the courts 
to withhold relief on this ground. It is telling that this idea played no part in the 
court’s thinking in Re the Great Escape Trust. Nor was the court willing to entertain 
such a principle in Re the Strathmullen Trust. 
The settlor in the latter case sold his shares in the family business for £2.1 
million and moved to the Isle of Man where he established a settlement governed 
by Jersey law. The trust property consisted of shares in a Jersey-registered 
company to which the money was paid; the beneficiaries were the settlor and his 
wife, with long stop trusts for charitable purposes. The purpose of this 
arrangement was to avoid IHT. However, the settlor’s advisors overlooked 
deemed domicile provisions in the UK tax legislation which meant that in spite of 
his move to the Isle of Man, he continued to be treated as domiciled in the UK for 
IHT purposes for 3 years after his move. As a result significant charges to IHT 
arose in relation to the transfers into trust. The settlor applied to have the 
settlement set aside on the ground of mistake and the Royal Court of Jersey 
granted this application. 
The court noted Lord Walker’s dictum, but brushed it aside: 52  
 
‘There is clearly more than one approach that one could take to what Lord 
Walker describes as an issue of some importance in the United Kingdom, 
and the arguments would be further complicated in this jurisdiction by a 
recognition that the social evil of artificial tax avoidance which puts an 
unnecessary burden on the shoulders of those who do not adopt such 
measures might receive a different emphasis where it is not our domestic 
taxation system which is being avoided. The complexity of such arguments, 
including the difficulties in establishing what amounts to a social evil 
where the relevant jurisdiction’s legislature can be assumed to have taxed 
everything that it intended to tax (which makes avoidance, on one analysis, 
entirely legitimate) emphasises that in the absence of any contentions to 
the contrary, it is unnecessary to consider such an issue further in this 
case.’ 
 
                                                        
52 Strathmullen (n 46) [25]. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, similar comments have also been made elsewhere 
in the offshore trust world. In Nourse v Heritage Corporate Trustees Ltd Deputy 
Bailiff MacMahon said that where a transaction:53 
 
‘did not avoid payment of any tax due to the States of Guernsey … the Jurats 
might feel that the underlying purpose of the transaction did not itself add 
anything either way as to whether it would be unconscionable, or unjust, 
to leave any mistake they might find uncorrected.’ 
 
Similarly, Smellie CJ has said extra-judicially that:54  
 
‘In the socio-political context of the Cayman Islands, there can be no 
presumption that an arrangement, which is otherwise within the law not 
only of the Cayman Islands, but also of the relevant domiciliary jurisdiction, 
is to be deemed “artificial” simply because its primary aim is to mitigate the 
incidences of tax.’ 
 
(4) Conclusion 
The Jersey legislature and courts lean more overtly than the English courts 
towards favouring the interests of settlors, trustees and their professional 
advisors over the interests of tax authorities, particularly foreign tax authorities. 
But the generosity of the English courts towards the former group means that the 
disparity between the approaches taken by the two systems towards rescission 
for mistake is now less pronounced than it was before. 
                                                        
53 Unreported, Royal Court of Guernsey, 1 January 2015, [16]. See too the Jurats’ statement at [71] 
that they did ‘not regard the fact that the Applicant was participating in a scheme to avoid payment 
of taxes in the United Kingdom as any reason to refuse to grant the relief if it would otherwise be 
given.’   
54 ‘Chief Justice Smellie, ‘Dealing with Mistakes of Trustees or Settlors: The Outlook from the 
Offshore Bench’ (2014) 20 T&T 1101, 1109. On the same general theme, see also Deemster Doyle’s 
remarks in AB v CD, unreported, Isle of Man Ch D, 30 June 2016. 
